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2 New Perspectives on Political Economy
1 Introduction
With the rise of New Institutional Economics, even mainstream economics accepts the
fact that institutions matter. By this they mean that it is not only factor accumulation,
but also the ‘rules of the game’ that determine the economic growth of a country (East-
erly – Levine 2001). The economists of the Austrian School have always stressed the
role of institutions more firmly than the neoclassicals. It was during the so called calcu-
lation debate that this difference between Austrian and neoclassical economists became
clear (Boettke 1997:31-36): in his famous paper Mises (1920 [1990]) argued that without
two fundamental institutions, private property and money, rational calculation (and thus
socialism) is impossible.
This paper aims at examining the relationship between economic growth and institu-
tions in an Austrian perspective. As Boettke (2001) has shown, the problem is not what
institutions are necessary for economic growth, because we know the answer to this ques-
tion: private property, the rule of law, stable money, and the freedom to contract. What
we do not know is how to acquire these institutions. The examination of institutional
coherence is one possible way of dealing with this broader problem. In this paper I argue
that the fundamental institutions of the market economy have an effect on the level and
coherence of the regulation of a country. It is not only the political system, but certain
fundamental market institutions too that determine regulation.
The paper is structured as follows. In next section I will discuss some fundamental
features of the relationship between the regulation of entrepreneurship and economic
growth. Section 3 provides a broad framework for understanding the institutional condi-
tions of coherent regulation, which is Lachman’s institutional theory. In section 4 I will
argue that the theory of interventionism is a possible explanation for the facts discussed
in section 2. Finally, in section 5 I will look for the institutional conditions for regulatory
coherence. Section 6 concludes.
2 Three facts about regulation and growth
A data set currently compiled and continually refreshed by the World Bank in the re-
port ‘Doing Business’ makes it possible to examine the regulatory environment of en-
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trepreneurship and its effects on economic performance. The most important of the
facts about the effect of regulation is that those countries that regulate less are richer than
those that regulate more. Djankov et al (2006) create an aggregate index for measuring
business regulation and show that even after controlling for several possible determi-
nants of growth, those countries which have more business-friendly regulation have also
a higher rate of economic growth. Djankov et al. (2002) have also shown that the greater
the number of procedures required to start a business, the more frequently occur various
variables associated with negative social outcomes, such as water pollution, accidental
death from poisoning and the unofficial economy.
As explained in detail in the next section, the notion of institutional coherence comes
from Lachmann (1970). He does not give an exhaustive definition of the term, which
he uses as the synonym for institutional unity and consistence, but reading Lachmann
(1970), one can conclude that institutional coherence refers to the fact that the elements
of institutional structure complement each other, and thus the institutional structure is
characterized by some unity, in which there are no logical contradictions. As a result of
this complementarity, there are certain circumstances in which the whole structure has
to change in order to remain coherent, because new institutional elements do not fit into
the structure.
The notion of coherent or consistent institutions also appears in the empirical lit-
erature dealing with market regulation. This new data set also makes it possible to ex-
amine the correlation of certain aspects of the regulation of entrepreneurship. In the
World Bank report, ‘Doing Business in 2004’, the correlations between different regu-
latory means1 are measured in a cross section of 133 countries (Worldbank 2004:89-90).
These results enable us to draw two conclusions. First, different areas of market regula-
tion move in step to a significant extent. If, for example, a government regulates the entry
of firms into the market more severely, it is probable that hiring and firing a worker is
also more burdensome than in a country where entry is freer. Second, the correlation be-
tween areas of regulation is stronger and more significant in developed than in developing
countries. As shown in World Bank (2004:89-90), the correlation between different areas
is statistically significant in more cases in developed countries than in developing coun-
1 In the year 2004 report data on regulation is available for the following areas: starting a business, hiring
and firing workers, enforcing contracts, getting credit, and closing a business.
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tries, and even though the correlation is significant in both developed and developing
cases, the relationship is stronger in developed countries.
Botero et al. (2004:1371-3) have also pointed out that the different areas of regulation
of entry and of the labor market strongly correlate. They see this fact as verifying the
legal theory approach of regulation. According to this, how much and what kind of
regulation governments apply in different markets depends on the legal origin2 of that
country. Since the legal origin shapes the government approach toward regulation in
general, this theory concludes that regulations in different areas have to go hand in hand.
The correlation is thus explained. However, they do not provide us with an explanation
of the mechanics lying behind this empirical evidence. What is the causal relationship
between law and regulatory coherence? In addition, they do not, and do not intend to,
explain why this mechanism is stronger in developed countries.
3 Levels of the institutional structure
The fact that regulatory coherence may be rooted in the institutional structure of a coun-
try suggests that there are fundamental institutions which determine how other – non-
fundamental – institutions will develop. Below I will argue that this approach is closely
related to the issue which Lachmann (1970) posed as the contradiction between institu-
tional flexibility and institutional coherence. Lachmann’s theory provides a framework
in which I will examine the questions raised in the previous section.
Lachmann’s main questions refer to the institutional structure as a whole (Lachmann
1970:51-52). First, institutions have to adapt to the changes of the economic and tech-
nological environment, but at the same time, they must remain stable to be able to play
their coordinative role in the economy. Second, if the institutions coordinate the actions
of the economic players, what coordinates the institutions? To put it another way, what
makes the institutional order a unity? And third, if some institutions within the whole
structure have to change, or if and when new institutions arise, what makes it possible for
the new institution to fit into the whole structure? To put it simply again, what makes
2 A country’s legal code can be of English (common law), French (civil law), German, Scandinavian, or
Socialist origin.
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it possible for the institutional structure to preserve its unity after some of its elements
have changed?
In answering these questions, the starting point for Lachmann is Max Weber’s in-
sights. He analyzes Weber’s several works in detail, but the most important here is that
referring to the roles different players play in institution building. According to Weber
(Lachmann 1970:60-66), institutions are, at the very origin, the innovations of an individ-
ual or of a certain group of people. At the beginning, institutions are not the results of
the unanimous vote of a community. These innovators are not, however, the ones who
make the institutions work. There is another group whose members run the institutions,
and, very importantly, who interpret its purpose differently from the innovators. A third
group consists of those people whose actions the institutions coordinate, and for whom
the institutions represent points of orientation. He also mentions a fourth group, the
members of which simply learn to use the institutions by tradition without knowing its
original (or any) purpose. Of course, this line of reasoning deals with the evolution of
undesigned (organic) institutions and the focus of the present paper is regulation, which
typically consists of designed institutions. But the latter description of different groups is
still valid in the case of regulatory institutions, and Lachmann’s (1970:69) main question
still remains: “What reasons have we to believe that all institutions, designed and unde-
signed, will easily fit into a coherent whole, when already the undesigned by themselves
leave us in some doubt?” This is the main problem of Lachmann’s work: the problem of
the coherence and permanence or coherence and flexibility of the institutional structure.
As the undesigned institutions evolve spontaneously, and thus unexpectedly, two prob-
lems arise: (1) As mentioned above these institutions have to fit into an already existing
system; beside the fact that the new institutions have to replace old ones, they have to
be able to complement the others. (2) Designed institutions can only react to known or
possibly known situations, but the undesigned institutions, as a result of the discovery
process of the market, bring genuine uncertainty into the picture. This means that be-
cause of the creative process of institutional evolutions, situations which nobody could
ever conceive before may arise, making the design of institutions impossible.
One possible answer to this problem – according to Lachmann – is a two level in-
stitutional structure. The first level consists of external, designed institutions which are
relatively stable, while the second level is where internal, undesigned institutions can
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evolve in the interstices of external institutions. The coherence of the institutional struc-
ture thus depends on the existence of some fundamental institutions that allow the others
to change.
Several important conclusions can be drawn from the discussion above. First, some
institutions have to change during the process of development, and this process of insti-
tutional change is the result of entrepreneurial discovery.3 Thus internal institutions are
the “crystallization” of entrepreneurial discoveries which can spread by imitation.
Second, external institutions should be those which do not have to change quickly.
That is, the government has to design those institutions which do not have to adapt to
changes in the economic environment. The latter changes mainly refer to entrepreneurial
discoveries other than the creation of new internal institutions. The fact that in the mixed
economy the government can make any internal institutions external does not assure
that those external institutions should be external. Exactly because they are fundamental
institutions of the market.
Third, some fundamental institutions have to stay stable. In the market economy
these are private property and the freedom of contract (Mises 1920 [1990]). Lachmann
adds another reason why the freedom of contract is important: without this institution
it is impossible to discover new internal institutions.
4 Interventions and growth in Austrian theory
In this section I will argue that the Austrian (misesian) theory of interventionism pro-
vides a possible explanation as to why regulatory rules move together across different
regulatory areas. Further, I will demonstrate that the theory can also explain why reg-
ulation harms growth and why more a severe regulatory system is more difficult to cut
down. I propose that regulatory measures are internal institutions that the intervention-
ist government defines as external “artificially”.
3 On the kirznerian entrepreneur and entrepreneurial discovery see later.
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4.1 Mises’s theory of interventionism: regulation leading to further regulation
Ludwig von Mises was one of the greatest critics of the “economic system” which is
capitalist in the sense that it is based on private property, but where the government
intervenes in the working of the market so as to modify the allocation of resources. As
Mises (1929 [1996]:20) put it, “interventionism is a limited order by a social authority
forcing the owners of the means of production and entrepreneurs to employ their means
in a different manner than they otherwise would”. This means that interventionism is
the misesian expression for what we call now a mixed economy.
In his writings dealing with interventionism, A Critique of Interventionism and In-
terventionism: An Economic Analysis, Mises makes it clear that the question is not
whether we need a government to enforce contracts; the question is rather what is the
proper scope of government (Mises 1926:18). The main question posed here by Mises
is whether interventionism as an alternative system of laissez faire, and socialism is a
possible and stable third system. His answer is no, it is not.
According to Mises, interventionism is not stable because the intervention always
has unintended consequences which require further intervention if the government still
wants to reach its objective. Thus, interventionism is an ever expanding package of reg-
ulatory measures, and as such, is not stable. In the end, either the economy becomes
socialist, or it goes back to laissez faire. “There is no other choice: government either ab-
stains from limited interference with the market forces, or it assumes total control over
production and distribution. Either capitalism or socialism; there is no middle of the
road” (Mises 1926 [1996]:26). I do not intend to deal with the puzzle that despite this
prediction, each economy of the developed world has been ‘mixed’ during last century,
and although they undergo changes, they do not seem to go back to laissez faire. This
puzzle is elaborated on by Ikeda (1997), or Higgs (2003).
Here, I am focusing on Mises’s argument, and on how this argument can be applied
to explain the above-mentioned correlation between measures of regulation. The defini-
tion of interventionism given by Mises does not include every possible interventionist
measure taken by the government. The definition excludes partial socialization of the
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factors of production and “market-friendly” interventions. It is not intervention when
a government buys and sells goods on the market. Basically, there are two means of
intervention: “restrictions of production” which refers to direct burdens on production
imposed by the government; and “interference with the structure of prices” i.e. setting
minimum or maximum prices in the market for goods, or factors of production.4 Mises’s
argument highlights the interrelationships between these measures.
In the present context this argument is important because it can give an explanation
for why regulatory institutions move together. In general, the argument is as follows.
Introducing a regulatory measure has unintended consequences which make impossible
the very aims the authority wanted to achieve. To correct this ‘mistake’ the authority
introduces another, different measure to correct the unintended consequences. But the
new measure has again unintended and unexpected consequences which threatens the
original aim of the intervention. The means of intervention complement each other, and
the mechanism behind this complementarity is the logic of intervention.
We can better understand this mechanism by examining Mises’s examples more
closely. One of his examples of the interventionist process is that of a maximum price
on some agricultural products. The aim of the regulator is to deliver the product to the
consumers more cheaply than before. The price set as a maximum, however, must be
lower than the equilibrium price of the product, otherwise this kind of regulation makes
no sense. As a result, there will be a shortage on the market for that certain product. The
government has to take new interventionist measures to correct the problem. One pos-
sible intervention is rationing; that is, defining how much of the product one consumer
may consume. Rationing is not enough to deliver as much product to the consumers as
the government wanted to before, because it cannot eliminate shortage. It has to take fur-
ther measures to prevent the producers moving their factor of production into another
4 Mises is not perfectly consistent concerning how many categories of intervention he differentiates be-
tween. In his earlier work (Mises 1926 [1996]) he discusses the possibility of including taxation as a third
class of interventionist measure, but he rules it out, claiming that the effects of a certain tax are the equiv-
alent of either a kind of production control or a kind of price control. However in his magnum opus
(Mises 1949 [1996]) he deals with taxation as an alternative type of government intervention. For a cri-
tique of Mises’s taxonomy of regulatory measures see Lavoie (1982). He argues that Mises’s analysis of
interventionism is incomplete and partially incompatible with the misesian view of the market process.
His main critique refers to the way Mises deals (or does not deal) with the role of the expenditure side of
government interventions.
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industry. To sum up, the regulation of a market for a certain product will imply the re-
gulation of the market for factors of production. In this process the regulation becomes
deeper and more extended.
Another example is a minimum price on labor; the minimum wage (Mises 1926
[1996]:26-29, 1923[1996]:148-150, 1940[1998]:30-34). Since labor is not the only factor
of production and labor is not the only source of income, the minimum wage does not
increase the income of each factor of production proportionally. This will decrease the
consumption of the owners of capital, and this, in the end, will decrease the demand for
labor and result in unemployment. This latter being again an unintended consequence,
the government has to react. The reaction can be twofold. Either, the government will
force the employer (the owners of capital) to employ those without a job, or they will
force them to pay more taxes so as to compensate the unemployed for their lost jobs
and incomes. Either of these two possible interventions will decrease the capital owners’
income, and thus reduce the capital stock. Because of this, in the end the real wage will
be lower than it would have been without imposing the minimum wage. Certainly this
was not what the interventionists intended.
If the minimum wage takes effect only in one industry, then the real wage increases
only in that industry, and this will lower the wage in other industries. To avoid this con-
sequence, the government has to ban or at least limit the hiring of workers in the industry
in question. This, through the mechanism described above, reduces the income of the
other factors of production, and in the end, the amount of production. Again, to avoid
this unintended consequence, the government will take further restrictive measures.5
Mises also has shown that the problems triggered by labor market regulation can
only be more intense when applied together with other regulations, for instance with
protectionism. Regulation of foreign trade, for example imposing tariffs on imports, will
induce the labor force to move from the export sector to the import sector. The more
5 Benham (2005) emphasizes that responses to new regulation do not necessarily occur in the price-quantity
dimensions and he provides a taxonomy of the licit and illicit responses a new regulatory measure can
trigger. The possibility of various kinds of reaction contributes further to the conclusion that regulation
will always have unintended consequences. He also discusses several examples of regulation leading to fur-
ther regulation but he stresses the role of a different mechanism than Mises does. The “path dependence”
of regulation is in a great part due to the fact that new regulations create new interest groups and these
new interest groups want more regulation to avoid the side effects of previous regulations.
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severe the regulation of the labor market, the harder it is for this process to take place,
and the more distortion the protectionism will cause in the structure of production.
Nevertheless, Mises (1940 [1996]:28-29) deals with two cases in which price regula-
tion does not necessarily lead to inefficiency. In the first case, some specific factors of
production are applied in the industry, and they are used to their full potential. Setting
a maximum price will not reduce production until the rent of the marginal producer is
positive. But this kind of regulation will still cause a shortage, which will induce the
regulation authority to react.
In the second case the industry is monopolistic. If this is the case, the price can be
reduced until it reaches the equilibrium price of a possible competitive market. We must
add, however, that monopolies and cartels can easily be a result of a former regulation.
Thus, this example strengthens further the misesian conclusion that interventionism is
an ever-expanding set of regulatory measures.6
In sum, the basis of the misesian argument and the mechanism behind the relation-
ship of different regulatory measures is the fact that “the effect of intervention is the very
opposite of what it was meant to achieve” (Mises 1923 [1996]:150). This suggests that
Mises does not apply the approach of modern political economy or public choice theory
and does not integrate some model of politics into his analysis. He does not intend to ex-
plain how regulatory measures come into being. Although the title of his famous paper
‘theory of price controls’ suggests to the present day reader that it deals with how the
existence of price controls can be explained, what it elaborates on is the consequences of
price controls. Despite all this, Mises does not naively suppose that politicians are bene-
volent and work for social welfare. He makes it clear that price and production controls
are to serve the interest of some group of society against the interest of another group.
He identifies restrictive measures with privileges given to some group of people. “The
interventions, therefore, may be regarded as privileges, which are granted to some at the
expense of others” (Mises 1940 [1998]:19). The misesian analysis begins when those in
power have already decided which interest group to support. The purpose of the analysis
6 Even “market failures” to which regulators often refer as a reason to regulate may result from a former
(and forgotten) government intervention. Coase (1960), for example, shows in his seminal paper that even
one example of Pigou could be seen in this light. One of Pigou’s examples for negative externality refers
to the uncompensated damage that sparks coming from railway engines cause to woods. Coase (1960)
pointed out that this situation was the result of a law.
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is to show that price or production controls cannot help to achieve the aim, because these
measures will eventually harm that interest group whose grants the government intended
to raise. All this means that Mises takes the purposes of economic policy as given: he
does not argue against the aims but the means.
Since the purpose of this paper is to analyze the formation of the restrictions of en-
trepreneurship, the direct product restrictions seems to be more important than price
controls. The market restrictions which present day economies apply, such as licenses
to start a business or to enter a different branch of business, administrative procedures
required for exporting, importing or selling and buying a property, regulations to protect
consumers and so on, can be classified into the latter group. However, the mechanism
through which direct restrictions of production take their effects and induce further re-
strictions is no different from that of price controls. The argument against them is the
same too: Mises (1949 [1996]:743-757) does not doubt the aims of this kind of policies.
Rather, he shows that these means are not sufficient to achieve the purposes set out by
the authority. And if it is true, restrictions on production start the same spiral of inter-
ventionist measures as price regulations do.
Two conclusions come to mind. First, although interventionist measures are designed
and thus external institutions in the lachmannian sense, they do not belong to the funda-
mental institutions of the market, since the misesian analysis shows that an intervention-
ist system is not stable. It cannot solve the stability versus flexibility problem, because
the reactions of the system cannot reduce efficiency problems. Second, the process of
interventionism is an explanation as to why different regulatory measures correlate; that
is, why more severe regulation in area or industry implies similarly severe regulation in
another one.
4.2 Intervention, coordination and growth
The notion of growth is inherently connected to the notion of welfare. By referring
to ‘growth’ we intend to refer to the increase in welfare. The traditional (neoclassical)
understanding of aggregate economic growth can be derived from neoclassical welfare
theory and from the notion of social welfare. As Kirzner (1973, 1998) argues, this concept
is not compatible with that of the entrepreneurial market process and the view of the
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market which is not based on the problem of resource allocation but on the knowledge
problem.
However, is there at all any normative concept which can fit into the Austrian view
of the market economy, and which can be a basis for an Austrian growth theory? Kirzner
(1973:212-242, 1998) argues that a normative concept compatible with subjectivist views
is coordination. He defines coordination (Kirzner 1998:292) as a state of affairs in which
“each action taken by each individual in a demarcated set of actions, correctly takes into
account (a) the actions in fact being taken by everyone else in the set, and (b) the actions
the others might take were one’s own action to be different”. According to Kirzner (1973,
1998), this kind of a normative criteria satisfies the subjectivist requirements because it
requires the construction of no aggregate welfare function, but one does not have to
assume even the existence of social welfare.7 It is only the compatibility of individual
plans that count, and not the final state or allocation at which these plans are aimed.
We can conclude from this short overview of the role of coordination in the Austrian
welfare theory that a possible subjectivist definition of growth is the improvement in
coordination. This latter occurs when the market system moves from a less coordinated
state of affairs to a more coordinated one.
Ikeda’s (1998) theory, by which he develops further Mises’s theory described above,
is crucially important from the viewpoint of the present paper, since he integrates the
notion of coordination into the theory of interventionism. As he argues, there are two
possible ‘coordinational understandings’ of the theory of intervention. According to
the first one, the coordination is only reduced when the vicious circle of intervention is
ended, i.e. when the social ownership of assets is the name of the game. In this view the
change in discoordination is discontinuous, because the decrease in coordination occurs
only at the end of the process. Until the end, the level of coordination does not change.
According to the other interpretation for which Ikeda (1998) argues, discoordination can
also continuously change, i.e. in this case, decrease. Every interventionist measure pushes
the market order a bit further away from full plan coordination. This latter view will be
useful in the present context too.
7 “It is possible to evaluate a system of a social organization’s success in promoting the coordination of
the decisions of its individual members without invoking any notion of social welfare at all” (Kirzner
1973:216-217).
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Ikeda integrates his interpretation of interventionism into the theory of the mar-
ket process. In short, this view holds that the market is a process of trial and error
and of entrepreneurial discoveries. During this process the market is always in disequi-
librium, expressed in arbitrages which are continuously discovered and utilized by en-
trepreneurs. Entrepreneurs make mistakes too, however. They make errors of judgment
(Ikeda 1998:39-40) when they refuse an offer higher than their reservation prices, because
they wrongly expect a better offer; or when they take an offer because they wrongly do
not expect a better one. And they also make errors of neglect, when they do not notice
an offer which they would otherwise accept. The underlying hypothesis of Ikeda (1998)
is that the errors of neglect are more difficult to discover and they can only be perceived
by a more dynamic form of discovery. In this framework interventionism is the process
of curing and discovering errors – but only those of judgment. These are those judgments
which are manifested in spectacular disequilibrium phenomena. Errors of neglect ‘only’
imply an inefficient allocation of resources. A possible start of the deregulational spiral
is when these mistakes become visible too.
It is also important that Ikeda (1998) shows that the further the system is from the
state of full coordination, the less possible it is to get back, because of the greater number
of mistakes the players will make. This argument is based on the notion of interdepen-
dence between markets. An entrepreneurial action takes its effect on several markets’
equilibrium prices. If an entrepreneurial discovery brings one market closer to the equi-
librium, it makes it possible for the players of other markets to calculate with prices
closer to the equilibrium, and this is why their calculations will be more correct. The
less ‘disequilibrative’ the prices are on which they calculate, the more mistakes they will
commit, and the less possible it is that their entrepreneurial actions will push the whole
market back toward full plan coordination. In sum, as in interventionism the system of
prices does not express profit opportunities correctly any more, the probability of taking
back the market close to the equilibrium by entrepreneurial discoveries will decrease.
Another very important reason why the further we are from the state of laissez faire,
the more discoordinated the system is, is the following (Ikeda 1998:43-45). (1) The more
weakly the property rights are defined, the more impossible it is that the entrepreneurial
action will improve coordination, and (2) interventionism weakens property rights. That
is, the more interventionist measures the government takes, the less secure the property
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rights are, and the more distorted the market prices are. This conclusion comes from
the fact that the extent to which prices can play their calculational role depends on how
secure private property is. In its extreme form this was the most important argument of
Mises in the calculation debate (Mises 1920[1990]): because it is without private property,
has no price system and thus no economic calculation, socialism – an economic system
based on public ownership of the factors of production – is impossible. Of course, in-
terventionism is not socialism because it does not put an end to the system of private
property, but it violates that. First, because the interventionist measures, controls, sub-
sidies, and taxes levied to finance them limit the use, sale, and the income from private
property and thus they weaken the rights to private property. In addition, since by inter-
ventionist measures the government always privileges an interest group, these measures
do not have an equal effect on each type of private property, which makes the distortions
on the price system more severe.8
Three conclusions of Ikeda’s theory must be emphasized here. First, integrating the
notion of coordination into the misesian theory of interventionism explains the fact men-
tioned in section 2 that the countries that regulate more are poorer and growmore slowly.
As we have seen, the more regulation there is, the less possible it is for an entrepreneur
to improve the coordination of the whole system. But an improvement in coordinating
is growth itself.
Second, it provides an answer for the question why undeveloped countries that regu-
late more cannot deregulate as easily as developed countries can. As the regulatory mea-
sures serve some interest group (Stigler 1971), it is always difficult to cut them back. Just
as Ikeda’s theory can explain why entrepreneurs with greater interventionism can disco-
ordinate with greater opportunity than those with less interventionism, it also explains
why the interest groups of undeveloped countries can argue more effectively against free
entrepreneurship.
Third, with the help of Ikeda’s insights we are able, at least in theory, to identify a
criterion for when the process of interventionism will cease to work and possibly turn
back, starting a reverse process toward less regulation. This is the moment when the
government has to choose whether to eliminate interventionism or to go further on the
8 “Every step that takes us away from private ownership of the means of production and from the use of
money also takes us away from rational economics” (Mises 1920:13).
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road to socialism.9 This moment comes when the errors of neglect committed because
of interventionism become spectacular and make it clear for politicians that the process
has to be turned back. An important remaining question is what determines the speed at
which these errors of neglect accumulate.
5 Interventionism, entrepreneurship and enforcement of rules
So far I have been arguing as follows. Lachmann’s theory of institutions implies that an
institutional structure that solves the flexibility-stability problem must have two levels.
The stability of external institutions assures that internal institutions resulting from the
discovery procedure of the market can continually change. Regulatory institutions are
designed, but not fundamental institutions of the market economy. As we have seen from
the misesian analysis, interventionism, the system based on the interrelated measures of
regulation, is not stable. The theory also explains the fact that measures of intervention-
ism correlate through countries: one measure implies another that implies yet another
and so on. The existence of such interventionist measures prevent the market process
from reducing discoordination as fast as it can on the free market, the consequence of
which is that the countries that regulate more are poorer than those that regulate less.
The reduced probability of reducing coordination also provides some explanation as to
why it is more difficult to reduce regulation for those countries that regulate more.
In the following paragraphs I will argue that interventionism paralyzes the discovery
procedure of internal institutions, and this continually raises the extent to which the
above mentioned errors of neglect are present. How effective the government is in this
activity is a function of the efficiency of the enforcement of the rules. Being efficient in
enforcing the rules, the government makes the errors of neglect more spectacular and the
deregulation more urgent.
9 “If governments do not give them [interventionist measures] up and return to the unhampered market
economy, if they stubbornly persist in the attempt to compensate by further interventions for the short-
comings of earlier interventions, they will find eventually that they have adopted socialism” (Mises 1940
[1998]:91).
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5.1 Entrepreneurship and growth
Some recent writings (Holcombe 1998, 2003a, 2003b, 2003c) explain economic growth
in terms of kirznerian entrepreneurship and make important contributions to the un-
derstanding of the creative process of the market.10 Holcombe (1998) recognizes that in
order to explain the growth process by the theory of market process and entrepreneur-
ship, we must give some explanation for the birth of profit opportunities; otherwise it is
still exogenous shocks that keep the market in motion and cause growth.
Holcombe (2003a, b) differentiates between three sources of profit opportunities: fac-
tors that disequilibriate the market, factors that enhance production possibilities, and the
activities of other entrepreneurs. Furthermore, he argues that the latter is by far the
most important “origin” of profit opportunities. This category of the origin of profit op-
portunities refers to the fact that “[w]hen an entrepreneur takes advantage of previously
unnoticed profit opportunities, this creates new profit opportunities, allowing other en-
trepreneurs to act” (Holcombe 2003a:33). According to this, what keeps the market
process in motion is entrepreneurship, which by exploiting existing profit opportuni-
ties creates new ones. Thus, even the mistakes entrepreneurs commit represent profit
opportunities to others, because they can learn from, and correct the mistakes.
If we differentiate between two types of entrepreneurial action, perception of profit
opportunities and their exploitation, then it is the exploitation that serves as an origin
for a new opportunity. As perception of profit opportunities cannot by its nature be
transferred to other people, it would be impossible to identify the causal link between
the perceptions of two different entrepreneurs. This also implies that new profit oppor-
tunities created by the exploitation of profit opportunities cannot be predicted by the
nature of the market process, because if they were, they would be exploited at once.
The regime of market regulation, described above as interventionism, prevents or
at least slows down this process. The essence of interventionism is a prevention of the
exploitation of profit opportunities: the government forbids some exchanges that other-
wise would have occurred. But as we have seen, interventionism does not remain only
a one-time prohibition of a certain type of entrepreneurial activity; it is the continuous
10 Holcombe’s 1998 article started a debate in the Quarterly Journal of Austrian Economics (see Hülsmann
1999, Shostak 1999, Holcombe 1999).
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prohibition of different kinds of entrepreneurial activities. This is because by prevent-
ing the exploitation of some arbitrages, it creates new ones, the exploitation of which
induces a new turn of regulation and so on. Thus, interventionism is also a process of
creating and exploiting arbitrages; but while intervention creates profit opportunities by
force, entrepreneurial activity creates profit opportunity by discovery. The exploitation
of profit opportunity created by discovery is what we call economic growth, while the
exploitation of profit opportunities created by force can only mitigate the discoordinat-
ing effect of regulation. The regulatory measure does not bring about a new state of full
plan coordination toward which the economy can move closer through the acts of the
arbitrage-perceiving entrepreneurs, but entrepreneurial discovery does.
Since the exploitation of present arbitrages is the source of future profit opportunities
and interventionism is the process of preventing the exploitation of arbitrages, market
regulation is equivalent to the elimination of future profit opportunities. This is the way
in which errors of judgment today are transferred to errors of neglect tomorrow. The
more seller and buyer remain disappointed because of exchanges prevented by restric-
tions – that is, the more errors of judgment occur today – the more arbitrages remain
unexploited, and the less profit opportunities remain uncreated and unnoticed, that is,
the more errors of neglect there will be in the future.
Entrepreneurs can exploit profit opportunities by creating internal institutions de-
scribed in section 3 dealing with Lachmann’s theory. To exploit arbitrage, the entrepre-
neur needs to employ factors of production, which the freedom of contract, a fundamen-
tal institution (beside private property) of the market economy, makes possible for her
or him. A new form of contract is a new technology of exchange, and as a new inter-
nal institution, it is a form of exploitation of profit opportunities. As such, this is an
entrepreneurial action which creates further profit opportunities. Sooner or later, this
new form of contracting will be outperformed or replaced by others. As Greif (2005)
and Brousseau et al. (2004) point it out, there can be competition even between private
institutions; that is, between institutions with not only two, but several parties, and en-
forced by a private agency. The discoveries of such internal institutions are an inherent
part of the entrepreneurial market process. From this viewpoint interventionism is the
replacement of this process with regulatory rules: the authority sets the terms of con-
tracts instead of the actors and monopolizes the market for institutions (Pejovich 1994)
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by declaring one enforcement agency “official”. By doing this, the government prevents
the exploitation of further profit opportunities by the innovation of new internal in-
stitutions. Interventionism blocks the interstices in the institutional structure. This is
another channel through which regulation undermines the freedom to contract.
5.2 Enforcement and entrepreneurship
We must realize that so far we have assumed that beyond the fact that interventionist
measures are taken, the players face perfect institutions in the market. This may not be
so, however. As I briefly discussed before, Ikeda (1998) argues that interventionism can
weaken property rights, and I have argued that it weakens freedom of contract. But beside
property rights and freedom of contract, which are the most important fundamental
institutions of a market economy, institutions of enforcement also play a crucial role
mainly in economies based on impersonal exchange, as emphasized for example by North
(1990:54-60). The institutions of enforcement assure that those patterns of conduct which
other institutions prescribe should be followed. The efficiency of enforcement can thus
be characterized by whether the players follow the rules of the game manifested in the
institutions of society. The enforcement of the rules is perfect if all players accept the
rules as a constraint.
Not only private contracts, but, of course, the regulatory measures introduced by
governments are enforced by the state. What I am proposing is that enforcement through
its effect on entrepreneurship affects the coherence of regulatory institutions. My argu-
ment is based on the role of the entrepreneur and on the nature of the discovery proce-
dure discussed in previous paragraphs. Interventionist measures prevent the exploitation
of profit opportunities and prevent the possible discoveries of future profit opportuni-
ties as their origins are the exploitation of present opportunities. This argument is valid
if the regulatory rules are perfectly enforced. In the case of perfect enforcement those
arbitrages which are forbidden by the rules cannot be realized. Its effect for the future
entrepreneurial process is the same as if the profit opportunities had not been perceived at
all. On the contrary, if these rules are not enforced at all (if the enforcement is perfectly
inefficient), they do not represent obstacles for the entrepreneurial process.
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However, the reality lies somewhere between the two: rules are enforced imperfectly.
Regulation provides incentives for “unproductive” and even “destructive” entrepreneur-
ship as argued by Baumol (1990), because some rules stipulate rent seeking. In our coor-
dination language, the argument goes that the regulatory rules create profit opportunities
the exploitation of which does not bring about a better coordinated state of affairs. En-
forcement can be further weakened by the fact that regulation can also induce evasive
entrepreneurship. As Leeson and Coyne (2004) show, evasive entrepreneurship, which
aims at evading the legal system, is not rare in undeveloped countries, giving a reason
why these countries remain undeveloped. All these entrepreneurial activities such as un-
productive and evasive entrepreneurship result from the weak enforcement of the rules.
Corruption is a sign of poor enforcement. According to Mises (1949 [1996]:736)
corruption is a regular effect of interventionism. However, it may be not only the effect,
but also the aim of the regulation (Shleifer – Vishny 1993:611-613): government officials
may use regulation to influence economic actors to substitute those economic activities
on which it is difficult to collect bribes for those on which it is easier.
Regulation has two important effects on markets, both of which become more se-
rious as efficiency of enforcement increases. The first is the effect on the allocation of
resources, and this is what Mises described as the unintended consequences of interven-
tion. As the efficiency of enforcement increases, unintended effects of regulation which
induce the regulators to regulate further (or provide them with an excuse to regulate
further) become more serious.11 Thus, the more efficient the enforcement, the more
relevant the misesian argument is. The second effect of regulation is the effect it has on
the process of entrepreneurial discovery which I outlined in this section of the paper.
The more efficient the enforcement of the regulatory rules are, the less profit opportuni-
ties are exploited, and the less profit opportunities will be created for the future, which
means that more errors of neglect will occur in the future. As enforcement increases, this
effect also becomes more severe, because more profit opportunities remain undiscovered.
11 In an empirical paper, Almeida and Carneiro (2005) examine the effects that the enforcement of labor
regulations has on the performance of firms in Brazil. Since throughout Brazil the regulatory rules are
the same but enforcement differs from region to region, they are able to detect the effect of efficiency.
They find, consistently with the argument above, that stricter enforcement lead to worse firm outcomes,
such as real wages, productivity or investment. They argue that this is the result of lower labor market
flexibility in the case of more efficient enforcement.
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This lets us conclude that in those countries where enforcement mechanisms are more
efficient, market regulation will be both more coherent and easier. The first type of ef-
fect makes the interventionist process work faster, while the second kind provides more
incentives for the regulators to deregulate.12
In sum, weak enforcement on the one hand creates unproductive profit opportunities
and, on the other hand, makes it possible to realize some of those arbitrages which would
have been realized without regulations.13 Conclusively, provided that there is a critical
number of errors of neglect which “shake the entire politico-economic system” (Ikeda
1998:40), the more efficient the rule enforcement is, the sooner this moment will come.
Efficient enforcement spurs deregulation by making discoordination more spectacular to
decision makers.
6 Conclusion
In this paper I have applied Lachmann’s theory on institutions and the misesian theory
of interventionism to explain the facts that (1) the countries that regulate more grow
more slowly, (2) different measures of regulations move together across countries, and (3)
developed countries regulate more coherently. My basic argument is that the causes are to
be found in the fundamental institutions of the market. This is why the framework of my
analysis is the lachmannian structure of external and internal institutions. Mises’s theory
of interventionism can explain how one burden of free exchange can lead to another
measure of regulation and so on, until the economy ends up in a state of full socialism.
Thus, it is an explanation for regulatory coherence. Together with the coordinational
argument it can also explain how regulation harms growth.
The question I focused on in the second half of this essay is why developed countries
regulate less and more coherently at the same time. To provide an answer, I modeled the
growth process as a procedure of entrepreneurial discoveries, and I argued that the aim of
12 To use the typology of Bradley (2003), the efficient enforcement of rules is a criterion which can turn the
misesian method of interventionist expansionary cumulative dynamics into contractionary dynamics.
13 Stephen et al. (2004) argue that poor enforcement can be conducive to “nascent entrepreneurship” in
countries with financial institutions. The possibility of non-repayment of loans is a device for the en-
trepreneur to overcome cash-flow problems during the initial period of his or her entrepreneurship. Poor
institutions, the authors argue, can substitute for financial institutions, or to put it simply, poor institu-
tions compensate the entrepreneurs for the lack of financial institutions.
Czeglédi: Economic Growth and Institutional Coherence 21
regulation is to prevent this procedure. Enforcement plays a crucial role in determining
when the accumulating errors of neglect will shake the system. As developed countries
have more efficient formal and informal institutions of enforcement, the misesian “re-
gulatory spiral” moves faster and stops earlier because the errors will be revealed sooner.
The paper thus highlights a channel through which enforcement contributes to economic
development. The cost of the entrepreneurial discoveries that would have occurred with-
out the regulation is the unintended consequence of regulation that can stop the vicious
circle of interventionism. Enforcement does not only contribute to economic develop-
ment directly by property rights and freedom to contract, but indirectly by making the
consequence of the regulatory rules more severe for the regulators. The argument out-
lined in the paper can be seen as a small step towards analyzing entrepreneurial discovery
and kirznerian entrepreneurship in an imperfect institutional environment as suggested
by Subrick and Beaulier (2004) as a possible agenda for future research in Austrian eco-
nomics.
A broader context of my argument is that interventionism undermines all three fun-
damental institutions of the market: private property, freedom to contract, and enforce-
ment institutions. Ikeda (1998) shows how it undermines private property by unevenly
restricting the right to different kinds of private property (section 3.2.). It is almost
obvious that interventionism undermines the freedom to contract, too. However, as I
argued, it does not only exclude some present profit opportunities, but by forbidding
their exploitation, it prevents the discovery of some future arbitrages. Furthermore,
interventionism undermines enforcement by providing incentives for rent seeking and
corruption.
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